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ERISA'S PREEMPTION OF ESTOPPEL CLAIMS
RELATING TO EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ER-
ISA" or "the Act") has limited the ability of plan participants and
beneficiaries to recover under state common law estoppel claims
that relate to employee pension and benefit plans.' Congress en-
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, §§ 1— •
4082, 88 Stat. 829, 829-1035 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982)). ERISA is com-
prised of four major titles. Titles 1-1Il govern plan administration, fiduciary duties, and
remedies. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1242, ERISA §§ 1-3043. Title IV pertains to the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation and ERISA plan termination insurance. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-
1461, ERISA §§ 4001-4082. ER1SA also creates standards of fiduciary conduct for those
who govern the administration of such plans and establishes a cause of action for breach of
these fiduciary duties, See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104(01), 1109, ERISA §§ 404(a)(1), 409.
A number of United States administrative agencies administer ERISA. Responsibilities
for enforcing the civil remedial provisions or ERISA lie with the United States Department
of Labor and the United States Department of the Treasury. See id. §§ 1201-04, ERISA
§§ 3001-04. The Internal Revenue Service regulates the tax qualification standards and sets
requirements of minimum eligibility and participation percentages. Id, Additionally, the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, a governmental corporation created by ERISA under
the Department of Labor, provides termination insurance to guarantee that participants and
beneficiaries receive at least partial benefits from ERISA plans. See id. § 1302(a), ERISA
§ 4002(a). The basic policy provisions of ERISA set forth by Congress in part provide:
The Congress finds that the growth in size, scope, and numbers of employee
benefit plans in recent years has been rapid and substantial; ... that the
continued well-being and security of millions of employees and their dependents
are directly affected by these plans; that they are affected with a national public
interest; and . . . it is desirable in the interests of employees and their benefi-
ciaries, . that disclosure be made and safeguards be provided with respect to
the establishment, operation, and administration of such plans; ... [and] that
despite the enormous growth in such plans many employees with long years of
employment are losing anticipated retirement benefits owing to the lack of
vesting provisions in such plans; that owing to the inadequacy of current min-
imum standards, the soundness and stability of plans with respect to adequate
funds to pay promised benefits may he endangered; that owing to the termi-
nation of plans before requisite funds have been accumulated, employees and
their beneficiaries have been deprived anticipated benefits; and that it is there-
fore desirable in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, for the
protection of the revenue of the United States, and to provide for the free flow
of commerce, that minimum standards be provided assuring the equitable
character of such plans and their financial soundness,
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect interstate
commerce and the interests of participants in employee benefits plans and their
beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting to participants and
beneficiaries of financial and other information with respect thereto, by estab-
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acted ERISA in 1974 as a comprehensive legislative remedial statute
to provide reasonable assurance that benefits promised to employ-
ees under a private employee benefit plan would be available when
due. 2
 Prior to 1974, primarily state law governed employee benefit
plans administered by employers and unions. Unfortunately, state
law inadequately protected employee pension rights: Employees
had no guarantee that their employers would actually pay pension
benefits. 3 Congress recognized that pension plan establishment, ad-
ministration, and termination lacked adequate safeguards under
state law.4
 Congress also realized that inadequate funding and strin-
gent eligibility provisions were causing thousands of employees to
lishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of
employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions,
and ready access to Federal courts.
It is hereby further declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect
interstate commerce, the Federal taxing power, and the interests of participants
in private pension plans and their beneficiaries by improving the equitable
character and the soundness of such plans by requiring them to vest the accrued
benefits of employees with significant periods of service, to meet minimum
standards of funding, and by requiring plan termination insurance.
29 U.S.C. $ 1001, ERISA § 2. For general summaries and discussion of ERISA, see L. L.rrvAtt,
PENSION FUNDS & ECONOMIC RENEWAL (1981); D. LOGUE, LEGISLATIVE INFLUENCE ON COR-
PORATE PENSION PLANS 62-77 (1979). Several cases have addressed common law estoppel
claims under ERISA. See, e.g., Cleary v. Graphic Communications Int'l Union Supplemental
Retirement & Disability Fund, 841 F.2d 444, 449 (1st Cir. 1988) (the court did not address
the ERISA preemption issue, but proceeded to analyze the plan participant's claim under
the federal common law estoppel doctrine); Treadwell v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
666 F. Supp. 278, 286-87 (D. Mass. 1987) (although the court found the state common law
claim of wrongful termination preempted by ERISA, it recognized the employee's estoppel
claim without addressing preemption). But see O'Grady v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 635
F. Supp. 81, 83-84 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (state common law claim preempted by ERISA, therefore
the claim must be analyzed under ERISA's "arbitrary and capricious standard").
29 U.S.C. § 1001, ERISA § 2. ERISA defines "employee benefit plan" as "an employee
welfare benefit plan or an employee pension plan or a plan which is both an employee
welfare plan and a pension benefit plan." Id. § 1002(3), ERISA § 3(3), Also within the scope
of ERISA is an "employee welfare benefit plan," which includes any program that provides
benefits for illness, accident, disability, death, or unemployment." Id. § 1002(1), ERISA § 3(1).
Id. § 1001, ERISA § 2; 120 CONG. REC. S29,935 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (statement
of Sen. javits). Senator javits, one of the primary sponsors of ERISA, commented on ERISA's
effect. "[P]ension reform law is now a reality because of hardship, deprivation and inequity
suffered by American working people." 120 CONG. REC. S29,935 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974).
Senator javits stated that "[ERISA] is the greatest development in the life of the American
worker since Social Security. For the first time in our history most workers will be able truly
to retire at retirement age and to live decently on their Social Security and private pensions."
120 CONG. REC. S29,933 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974).
4 29 U.S.C. § 1001, ERISA § 2.
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lose their anticipated retirement benefits.' In order to establish
national uniformity, security, and stability of employee benefit plans,
Congress enacted ER1SA and created a comprehensive regulatory
scheme that displaced the state regulation of employee benefit
plans." As part of this scheme, ERISA provides for federal preemp-
tion of all state laws that "relate to" an employee benefit plan,'
unless the state law qualifies for an exemption.' This preemption
provision has limited all state laws, both decisional and statutory.
In addition to preempting state law, ERISA provides that fed-
eral courts may create a body of federal common law to supplement,
clarify, and implement ERISA policies." A number of different
5 120 CONG. REC. H29,214 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1974) (statement of Rep. Daniels); 120
REc. H29,215 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1974) (statement. of Rep. Broyhill).
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1144, ERISA §§ 2, 514; 120 CONG, REc. 529,933 (daily ed. Aug.
22, 1974) (statement of Sen. Williams).
7 29 U.S.C. § 1144, ERISA § 514. Senator Williams described the broad scope of section
514(a), ERISA's preemption clause as follows:
It should be stressed that with the narrow exceptions specified in the bill,
the substantive and enforcement provisions of the conference substitute are
intended to preempt the field for Federal regulation, thus eliminating the threat
of conflict or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans.
This principle is intended to apply in its broadest sense to all actions of State
or local governments . .
120 CONG. REC. 529,933 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974). The broad ERISA preemption of section
514 was similarly supported by Congressman Dent:
1 wish to make note of what is to many the crowning achievement or this
legislation, the reservation to Federal authority the sole power to regulate the
field of employee benefit plans. With the preemption of the field, we round out
the protection afforded participants by eliminating the threat of conflicting and
inconsistent State and local regulation. . . Thus, the provisions of section 514
would reach any rule, regulation, practice or decision of any State . which
would affect any employee benefit plan
120 CoNc. Rrc. H29,197 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1974).
8 ERISA provides for a number of exemptions to its broad preemptive scope. 29 U.S.C,
§ I144(b), ERISA § 514(b). These exemptions arose out of a compromise between complete
uniformity of employee benefit regulation and the tension to allow the states to regulate
certain areas that they had traditionally governed. See 120 CONG. REc. S29,942 (daily ed.
Aug. 20, 1974) (statement of Sen. Javits). The "savings clause" provides that "nothing in this
subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State
which regulates insurance, banking, or securities." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A), ERISA
§ 514(b)(2)(A) ("savings clause"). The "deemer clause" mitigates the impact of the "savings
clause." See id. 1144(b), ERISA § 514(b). The "deemer clause" provides Inleither an
employee benefit plan ... nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to
be an insurance company . for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate
insurance companies .. . ." /d. § 1144(b)(2)(B), ERISA § 514(13)(2)(13). For a recent Supreme
Court application of the "savings" and "deemer" clauses see Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,
481 U.S. 41, 47-49, 50-51 (1987).
See 120 CONG. REC. 529,942 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (statement of Sen. Davits).
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sources have guided federal courts in creating federal common law
under ERISA. Courts have looked to the statutory language and
underlying policies of ERISA.")
 Courts also have looked to other
federal labor statutes, including the Labor-Management Relations
Act ("LMRA") and the National Labor Relations Act ("NRLA")."
Finally, federal courts have consulted state common law principles
in formulating federal common law under ERISA.' 2
In a number of decisions over the past decade, the United
States Supreme Court has interpreted the scope and defined the
application of ERISA's broad preemption provision." In the 1987
Regarding the creation of federal common law under ERISA, Senator Javits stated: "Mt is
also intended that a body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal
with issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans." Id.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also described the purpose of the establishment
of federal common law under ERISA:
Congress realized that the hare terms, however detailed, of these statutory
provisions would not be sufficient to establish a comprehensive regulatory
scheme, It accordingly empowered the courts to develop, in light of reason and
experience, a body of federal common law governing employee benefit plans.
That federal common law serves three related ends. First, it supplements the
statutory scheme interstitially. Second and snore generally, it serves to clarify
and develop the standards that the statute sets out in only general terms. ...
Third, Congress viewed ERISA as a grant of authority to the courts to develop
principles governing areas of the law regulating employee benefit plans that
had previously been the exclusive province of state law.
Menhorn v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d 1496, 1499 (9th Cir. 1984) (citations
omitted); accord Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S.
I, 24 n.26 (1983) ("ERISA's legislative history indicates that, in light of the Act's virtually
unique pre-emptive provision ... a body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the
courts to deal with issues under private welfare and pension plans.").
'° See, e.g., Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956, 959 (11th Cir. 1986) (courts may create
federal common law only when ERISA does not expressly address case at issue); Amato v.
Western Union Intl Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1419 (2d Cir. 1985) (courts do not lightly create
additional rights under federal common law where Congress extensively regulates an area).
"\See Crossmuller v. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & AgricAttiplement
Workers of Am., Local 813, 715 F.2d 853, 857 (3d Cir. 1983) (in determining whether the
employer's pension plan claim procedure complied with ERISA, the court looked to section
301 of the LMRA to define the parameters of the ERISA "full and fair review" standard);
Music v. Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 712 F.2d 413, 418 (9th Cir.
1983) ("ERISA essentially codified the strict fiduciary standards that a section 302(c)(5) [of
the LMRA] trustee must meet"); Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 1980) (because
ERISA did not mention the exhaustion of available administrative remedies doctrine, the
court looked to § 301 of the LMRA for guidance consistent with the policies of ERISA),
12 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Local 705, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 713 F.2d 247, 251, 253 (7th
Cir. 1983) (court analogized to the most appropriate state statute of limitations because
ERISA does not contain a statute of limitations for enforcing rights under pension plans);
Amato, 773 F.2d at 1419 (court looked to New York state law in creating federal common
law under ERISA).
" See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 44-47 (1987); Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90-92 (1983).
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decision of Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, the Supreme Court
formally extended the scope of ERISA's preemption to include state
common law claims." The Court applied the plain meaning of the
"relates to" phrase to preempt state common law that had a "con-
nection with or reference to" an employee benefit plan.' 5
 Courts
both before and after the Pilot decision, however, have failed to
address clearly the issues regarding ERISA's preemption of state
common law claims of estoppel.' 6
Many courts prior to the Pilot decision incorporated state com-
mon law claims of estoppel into federal common law under ER-
ISA.' 7 Despite Pilot's holding that ERISA preempts state common
law claims that "relate to" an ERISA plan, some courts continue to
follow pre-Pilot precedent.' 8 Courts that had recognized state estop-
pel claims prior to Pilot continued to do so after Pilot because the
federal common law under ERISA had already incorporated such
claims. Other courts that held ERISA preempted state estoppel
claims prior to Pilot continued this trend after Pilot. Thus, the status
of federal common law claims of estoppel under ERISA is unclear.
This note discusses the tension between ERISA's preemption
of state common law estoppel claims and the formulation of federal
common law in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Pilot. Sec-
tion 1 reviews the history and purposes behind the enactment of
ERISA. 19 Section II discusses the preemption of state statutory and
common law under ERISA. 2 ° Section III presents pre-Pilot and post-
Pilot cases analyzing estoppel claims brought under ERISA. 21 Sec-
tion IV addresses the effect of federal preemption of state common
law claims of estoppel on the formulation of federal common law. 22
Section IV also discusses the tension between ERISA's preemption
of state common law claims and the formulation of federal common
481 U.S. at 50,57,
' 5 Id. at 47-48.
i" See, e.g., Cleary v. Graphic Communications Intl Union Supplemental Retirement &
Disability Fund, 84i F.2d 444,447 (lst Cir. 1988); Haeberle v. Board of Trustees of Buffalo
Carpenters Health-Care, Dental, Pension & Supplemental Funds, 624 F.2d 1132,1139 (2d
Cir. 1080).
17 See, e.g„ Haeberle, 624 F.2d at 1139; Kann v. Keystone Resources, Inc., 575 F. Supp.
1084,1093-94 (W.D. Pa. 1983),
1 " See, e.g., Straub v.. Western Union Tel. Co., 851 F.2d 1262,1264-65 (10th Cir. 1988);
Cleary, 841 F.2d at 447.
1"See infra notes 25-47 and accompanying text.
2" See infra notes 48-115 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 116-185 and accompanying tekt.
22 See infra notes 186-224 and accompanying text.
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law by looking to state common law:23 Section IV then proposes to
resolve this tension by suggesting a framework under which the
courts should adopt a uniform estoppel standard under ERISA,
but limit its application to situations consistent with ERISA's poli-
cies. 24
 This note concludes that federal common law under ERISA
can incorporate estoppel claims without compromising ERISA's pol-
icies. All the circuits, however, must adopt a uniform proposal in
order to have a consistent body of federal common law under
ERISA.
I. PURPOSE & HISTORY OF ERISA
In 1875, the American Express Company established the first
major pension plan in the United States. 25 Since 1875, the number
of employee pension and benefit plans has increased dramatically. 26
Prior to the passage of ERISA in 1974, however, no comprehensive
body of federal or state law existed in the United States governing
employee benefit plans. After attempting to implement several in-
termediate federal regulatory schemes, Congress enacted ERISA to
provide comprehensive protection to participants of employee ben-
efit plans. 27 One can only understand the need for ERISA's broad
preemptive framework in the context of prior state and federal
regulation of employee benefit plans.
Prior to ERISA, a number of various state and federal laws
governed the regulation of employee benefit plans. At the state
level, state trust and contract law or state insurance laws regulated
pension and welfare benefit plans. 28 State common law doctrine and
23 See infra notes 186-224 and accompanying text.
Sec infra notes 225-230 and accompanying text.
25 Hutchinson & irshin, Federal Preemption of State Law Under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, 46 U. CHL L. REV. 23, 24 n.5 (1978) (citing D. ROTIIMAN,
ESTABLISHING AND ADMINISTERING PENSION AND PROFIT-SHARING PLANS AND TRUST FUNDS I
(1967)),
2" See 120 CC/NG. REC. H29,214 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1974). In 1940, private pension funds
covered only 4.1 million employees with assets totalling $2.4 billion. By 1960, the number of
employees covered had increased to 21.2 million and assets totalling over $52 billion. In
1984, there were 880,000 private pension plans covering 65 million workers with assets
totalling over $900 billion. Id. (Department of Labor figures).
27 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982), ERISA § 2. See infra notes 30-47 and accompanying text
for a discussion of pre-ERISA regulation of employee benefit plans.
2.8 See generally Hutchinson & Ifshin, supra note 25, at 25-26; Herbert, Investment Reg-u-
lotion and Conflicts of Interest in Employer-Managed Pension Plans, 17 B.C. 'sms. Cost. L.
REV. 129, 143-47 (1976).
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insurance regulations, however, proved ill-equipped to govern the
complexities of employee pension plans. 29
At the federal level, Congress intervened in the regulation of
benefit plans through changes in income tax laws and labor legis-
lation." The tax law changes provided that employer contributions
to employee benefit plans were deductible as business expenses and
created a special category for "qualified" plans that permitted em-
ployees to defer taxation of employer contributions." In 1947, Con-
gress enacted the first major non-tax legislation relating to pension
plans, the Taft-Hartley amendment to the Labor-Management Re-
lations Act ("LMRA" ). 32 Section 302 of the LMRA required unions
that maintained employee benefit plans to hold the employees' con-
tributions to these plans in a trust. Congress designed this provision
to prevent what it perceived as abuses and corruption in labor
unions. 33 Section 302, however, inadequately regulated employee
benefit plans because it only applied to pension trusts established
through collective bargaining and managed and administered by
unions." Additionally, it imposed only a few 'specific requirements
in the governance of pension trusts."
In order to govern benefit plans established outside unionized
industries and to provide greater protection to participants, Con-
gress enacted the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act
29 See supra note 1 and accompanying text for a discussion of ERISA's basic policy
provisions set forth by Congress.
" 29 U.S.C. § 1001, ERISA § 2; 120 CONC. REC. 529,935 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974)
(statement of Sen. ,Davits). Fur a discussion of the early income tax provisions relating to pre-
ERISA pension plans, see Snyder, Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 11 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 219, 220-22 (1975); Note, The Pension Dilemma: An Analysis of Discord Between
IRS and the NLRB, 39 BROOKLYN L. REV. 684, 688-93 (1973); Note, Pension Plans and the
Rights of the Retired Worker, 70 CoLum. L. REV, . 909, 924-28 (1970).
3t See 26 U.S.C. § 401 (1982).
" 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1982).
" 29 U.S.C. § 186. Additionally, section 302 provides specific guidelines for union and
management administration and governance of pension trusts, Id. For a general discussion
of the Tart-Hartley Act, see Welch & Wilson, Applicability of Traditional Principles of Trust Law
to Union and Management Representatives Administering Taft-Hartley Trusts, 23 LAB. L.j. 671
(1972); Goetz, Developing Federal Labor Law of Welfare and Pension Plans, 55 CORNELL L, REV.
911 (1970), A pension trust is a type of funded pension plan in which an employer transfers
to trustees an amount sufficient to cover cost of pensions to employees who are beneficiaries
of the trust. BLACK'S Law DICTIONARY 1022 (5th ed. 1979).
Hutchinson	 Ifshin, supra note 25, at 27. In addition to requiring the union to hold
pension funds in trust, the principal and income of the fund must be kept in a separate
pension trust, jointly administered by representatives of management and labor pursuant to
a written plan. 29 U.S.C. 186(c)(5).
" Hutchinson & Ifshin, supra note 25, at 27.
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("WPPDA") of 1958. 36 Although WPPDA applied to non-unionized
employers, the federal role under WPPDA was limited: WPPDA
only required plan administrators to meet certain reporting and
disclosure requirements. 37 Specifically, WPPDA required adminis-
trators of plans with twenty-five or more participants to file reports
with the United States Secretary of Labor. 38 Furthermore, WPPDA
did not preempt state law regulating pensions plans."
Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 to respond to the rapid
growth of employee pension and benefit plans, increases in abuses
relating to employee benefit plans, and to overcome the inability of
the states to develop a comprehensive and uniform body of law.4°
To further these goals, ERISA contains detailed reporting and dis-
closure requirements.'" In addition, ERISA establishes minimum
participation, vesting, benefit accrual, benefit payment, and mini-
mum funding requirements. 42 ERISA also specifies standards of
conduct for plan trustees and administrators, and provides for civil
and criminal remedies in the event of statutory violations of the
plan by trustees.'" ERISA creates a benefit guaranty program that
insures against loss of benefits upon termination or insolvency of
an ERISA plan."
]6 Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997, 997-1003 (1958) (repealed by 29 U.S.C. § 1031(a)(1)
(1982), ERISA § 111(a)(1) (1974)).
57 72 Stat. 997, 999-1000 (1958).
" Id.
59 Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 505 (1978) ("[WPPDA,] together with
the legislative history of the 1958 Disclosure Act, clearly indicates that Congress at the time
recognized and preserved State authority to regulate pension plans"). See generally Hutchinson
& Ifshin, supra note 25, at 27-30.
4" 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1144, ERISA §§ 2, 514; 120 CONG. REC. S29,933 (daily ed. Aug.
22, 1974) (statement of Sen. Williams). Senator Humphrey hailed ERISA as the most signif-
icant piece of social legislation ever passed by Congress. 120 CONG. REC. 529,944 (daily ed.
Aug. 22, 1974) (statement of Sen. Long). Congressman Daniels stated that "Idluring the
century that private pension plans have been with us, they have grown phenomenally — and
without regulation.. , . But, consider that out of the 30 million employees enrolled in plans
[in 1974], almost a third, 10 million, will receive no benefits what[so]ever." 120 Cow,. Rec.
'H29,214 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1974).
41 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1030, ERISA §§ 101-110.
42 Id. §§ 1051-1060, 1081-1085, ERISA §§ 201-210, 301-305.
" Id. §§ 1101-1113, 1131-1142, ERISA §§ 401-413, 501-512. Federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction over all actions brought under section 502, with the exception of actions
to enforce the terms of a plan. States have concurrent jurisdiction over actions to enforce
plan terms. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1), ERISA § 502(e)(1). See generally Cornell & Little, Indem-
nification of Fiduciary and Employee Litigation Costs Under ERISA, 25 B.C.L. Rev. 1 (1983);
Dobranski, The Arbitrator as a Fiduciary Under The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974: A Misguided Approach, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 65, 67-70 (1982); Hutchinson & lfshin, The
federal Prudent Man Rule Under ERISA, 22 VILL. L. Rev. 15, 22-39 (1976).
41 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1453, ERISA §§ 4001-4061.
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Thus, as a result of the tremendous growth and increased
abuses relating to the administration of employee benefit plans,
Congress enacted legislation to govern employee benefit plans. 45
Because neither this legislation nor state regulation adequately pro-
tected participants of employee benefit plans, Congress enacted
ERISA in 1974. 4" Therefore, ERISA provided for the comprehen-
sive regulation of employee benefit plans, and it also preempted
state law relating to such plans. 47
II. ERISA's PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW
To accomplish its intended uniformity of employee benefit and
pension law, Congress enacted ERISA as a comprehensive regula-
tory scheme establishing national standards for employee benefit
and welfare plans. 48 Section 514(a), setting forth ERISA's broad
preemption power, expressly states that the provisions of ERISA
shall supersede any state law that "relates to" any employee benefit
plan covered by ERISA," According to the Supreme Court, a state
law "relates to" an employee benefit plan if the law has a "connection
with or reference to" such an employee benefit plan. 5°
Congress, however, limited the scope of ERISA's preemption
by providing statutory exceptions for specific types of laws "related
to" employee benefit plans." Thus, once a court determines that a
state law "relates to" an employee benefit plan, that court must then
" See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
See ,supra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 6-9, 40 and accompanying text.
as 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982), ERISA § 2 (1974).
4" Id. § 1144(a), ERISA § 514(a). See supra note 7 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the legislative history. .surrounding section 514(a). Also, in Shaw v. Delia Air Lines, Inc., the
Supreme Court, analyzing the legislative history of section 514, explained:
The bill that became ERISA originally contained a limited pre-emption
clause, applicable only to state laws relating to the specific subjects covered by
ERISA. The Conference Committee rejected those provisions in favor of the
present language and indicated that the section's pre-emptive scope was as broad
as its language.
463 U.S. 85, 98 (1983); see also Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v, Construction Laborers Vacation
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 n.26 (1983) (describing 514(a) as a "virtually unique preemption
provision").
5° Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-7. ERISA defines "state law" to include "all laws, decisions, rules,
regulations, or other State action having the effect of law." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1), ERISA
§ 514(c)(1). Section 514(c)(2) defines the term "state" to include "a State, any political sub-
division thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of either, which purports to regulate,
directly or indirectly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans covered by this
title." 29 U.S.C. § I144(c)(2), ERISA § 514(c)(2).
5 I See supra note 8 for a discussion of exemptions to ERISA's broad preemption clause.
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determine whether the state law is saved by one of ERISA's express
exceptions to its preemption provision. 52 Section 510)(4) provides
that the preemption provision of ERISA shall not apply to any
generally applicable state criminal laws." Additionally, section
514(b)(2)(A), the "savings clause," provides that ERISA preemption
shall not exempt any person from any state law that regulates
insurance, banking or securities." As a result, ERISA's exceptions
preserve the role of the states in regulating traditionally state-gov-
erned areas.
Section 514(b)(2)(B), the "deemer clause," limits the breadth of
ERISA's insurance savings clause. 55 The "deemer clause" provides
that an employee benefit plan or trust shall not be deemed to be an
insurance company, a bank, or a trust company for the purposes of
any state law purporting to regulate such institutions." In other
words, states may not simply label regulation of benefit plans as
"regulation of insurance" and thereby invoke the protection of the
savings clause. 57
A number of United States Supreme Court decisions inter-
preting ERISA's preemptive scope and application of the savings
and deemer clauses have held that ERISA preempts various state
laws. In the 1981 case of Alessi v. Raybestos -Manhattan, Inc., the
United States Supreme Court directly addressed the scope of ER-
ISA's preemption clause for the first time." The Court held that
ERISA preempted a New Jersey statute prohibiting pension offsets
by amounts awarded for workers' compensation claims."
In Alessi, an employee obtained workers' compensation benefits
subject to an offset against his retirement benefits under an em-
ployee pension plan." When he retired the former employee sought
52 See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41,46-47 (1987).
55 29 U.S.C. § 1 144(b)(4), ERISA § 514(6)(4). Section 514(b) also exempts plans under
section 4(b), including governmental plans, church plans, plans maintained solely for the
purpose of complying with applicable worker's compensation laws or unemployment com-
pensation or disability insurance laws, plans maintained outside the U.S. primarily for the
benefit of nonresident aliens, and unfunded excess benefit plans. Id. § 1003(b), ERISA § 4(b).
Congress also added two other limited exceptions to § 514(a), the Hawaii Prepaid Health
Care Act and certain "multiple employer welfare arrangements." Id. §§ 1144(b)(5),1144(b)(6),
ERISA §§ 514(b)(5), 5I4(b)(6).
54 Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A), ERISA § 514(h)(2)(A).
55 See id. § I144(b)(2)(B), ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B).
" Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B), ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B).
57 See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724,741-43 (1985).
58 451 U.S. 504, 522, 524 (1981).
a Id. at 526.
60 Id, at 508.
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to enjoin such offsets and recover damages for those deductions
already made."' The plaintiff claimed that ERISA preempted the
provision of the New Jersey statute allowing employers to adjust
for pension offsets."'
The Supreme Court stated that analysis of section 514(a), ER-
ISA's preemption clause, must be guided by respect for the separate
spheres of governmental authority preserved by the separation of
powers doctrine." 3
 Applying this policy, the primary factor that
persuaded the Court to rule for preemption was the fact that state
law conflicted with the ERISA method for calculating pension ben-
efits."' The federal interest in precluding state interference with
labor-management relations, the Court noted, provided additional
support for ERISA preemption because the pension plan had
emerged from the collective bargaining process. 65
 Therefore, the
Court in Alessi held that the state statute "related to" an employee
benefit plan, even though the Court conceded that the New Jersey
statute had only an indirect bearing on private pensions." While
partially clarifying the scope of section 514(a) in regard to workers'
compensation offsets, Alessi left unsettled the issue of the applica-
bility of ERISA's preemption to other state statutory and common
law."'
Following Alessi, in 1983, the United States Supreme Court in
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., expanded the parameters of the "relates
to" clause in section 514(a) and held that ERISA preempted a state
statute only indirectly associated with ERISA. 68
 Shaw, an employee
of Delta Air Lines, brought an action against the company for a
violation of state human rights law. He claimed discrimination in
the administration of Delta's employee benefit p1an. 69 In Shaw, the
issue was whether a New York Human Rights and Disability Benefits
"I Id. at 508 n.2.
h2 Id. at 509.
61 Id. at 522.
" Id, at 524.
65 Id. at 525.
66 Id. at 524-25. In support of preemption, Justice Marshall stated: "[Elven indirect state
action bearing on private pensions may encroach upon the area of exclusive federal concern,"
Id. at 525.
"7 Id. at 525 n.2I. Some judges interpreted Alessi to require a "direct dash" between state
law and ERISA prior to finding preemption. See, e.g.. Franchise Tax Rd. of Cal. v. Construc-
tion Laborers Vacation Trust, 679 F.2c1 1307, 1311 (9th Cir. 1982) (Tang, J., dissenting),
vacated on jures. grounds, 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
" 463 U.S. 85, 100 (1983).
" Id. at 92.
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Law "related to" an employee benefit plan." In holding that ERISA
preempted a state human rights statute that was only indirectly
related to ERISA, the Court gave an expansive interpretation to
section 514(a). 7 '
The Court, defining the scope of section 514(a), stated that a
law "relates to" an employee benefit plan in the normal sense of the
term if the law has a "connection with or reference to" such a plan. 72
The Court in Shaw then examined the legislative history of section
514(a) and concluded that Congress intended courts to interpret
section 514 as broadly as the plain meaning of its language." Thus,
following Shaw and Alessi, ERISA preempts all state statutory claims
if such claims have a "connection with or reference to" an employee
benefit plan, leaving the question of ER1SA's preemption of state
common law claims unanswered. 74
In the 1985 case of Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachu-
setts, the United States Supreme Court addressed ERISA's savings
and deemer clauses for the first time." The issue presented in
Metropolitan Life was whether ERISA preempted a state statute re-
quiring employers to provide certain mental health care benefits to
insured employees. 76 Metropolitan Life Insurance contended that
the state-mandated benefit laws were impermissible state regulation
of employee benefit plans."
The Court in Metropolitan. Life began its analysis by reaffirming
a broad, common-sense interpretation of section 514(a), ER1SA's
preemption clause. 78
 This interpretation included looking at the
plain meaning of the preemption clause." Applying the Shaw stan-
7" Id. at 96. The New York state law prohibited sexually discriminatory employment
practices with regard to compensation or other terms of employment. Id. at 97.
71 Id. at 97-100.
72 Id. at 96-97.
73 Id. at 98.
74 See id. at 96-97. Although the Court made it clear that the "relates to" clause would
be interpreted in its "normal sense" as Congress intended, the Court again failed to present
a principled formula to guide lower court decisions. See id. To add to the uncertainty, the
Court indicated that some state laws would not be preempted. Id. at 100 n.21. The Court
stated: "Some state actions may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or
peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that:the law 'relates to' the plan." Id.
75 471 U.S. 724, 739, 740-41 (1985). ERISA's preemption also includes state laws con-
sistent with ERISA's substantive requirements. See Shaw, 463 U.S. 85, 98-99.
76. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 727.
77 See id. at 733, 734. The effect of these laws was to require employee health care plans
to include the mandated mental health coverages. See id. at 727, 728.
78 Id. at 732.
79 Id.
September 19891	 EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS 	 1403
dard of "connection with or reference to," the Court concluded that
the state-mandated benefit law related to an ERISA plan." Thus,
section 514(a) preempted the state statute.$'
The Court then proceeded to analyze whether section
514(b)(2), the insurance savings clause, exempted the statute from
preemption. 82 The Court in Metropolitan Life held that the mandated
benefit laws fell within the savings clause exception to ER1SA's
preemption." Thus, Metropolitan Life, in interpreting the scope of
ERISA's savings clause, held that ERISA did not preempt the state
mandated-benefit law."
The first United States Supreme Court decision interpreting
ERISA's preemption clause in relation to state common law claims
was the 1987 case of Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux.85 In Pilot,
the Court held that ER1SA preempted a state common law claim
of "bad faith" where the state law did not regulate insurance. 86 The
Court ruled that the state action based on an alleged improper
processing of benefit claims "related to" an employee benefit plan
within the meaning of ER1SA's preemptive clause." ERISA's insur-
ance savings clause, the Court continued, did not save the common
law claims because the claims were not "specifically directed toward
or concerned with" the insurance industry. 88
Everate Dedeaux, the plaintiff in Pilot, was an employee of
Entex, which sponsored an ERISA-governed benefit plan." Pilot
8P
 Id, at 739.
81 Id. The court stated that, although the Massachusetts statute "is not denominated a
benefit-plan law, it bears indirectly but substantially on all insured benefit plans ... and thus
is covered by ERISA's broad pre-emption provision set forth in § 514(a)." Id.
82 Id. at 739-40. The Supreme Court for the first time addressed ERISA's "savings" and
"deemer" clauses. The Court also held that ERISA did not preempt a state statute from
regulating employee benefits provided under an insured plan. id. at 747. The Court also
recognized the distinction between insured and uninsured plans, but declared that Congress
created the distinction and Congress, therefore, would be responsible for resolving those
problems. Id.
82 Id. at 744.
84 Id.
85 481 U.S. 41, 45 (1987). In Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Taylor, a companion
case to Pilot, the United States Supreme Court held that, although ERISA preempts state
common law actions, courts can recharacterize a state law complaint as an action arising
under ERISA regardless of whether the preemption was obvious at the time the suit was
filed. 481 U.S. 58, 66, 67 0987). This recharacterization, however, is limited to the purpose
of removal to federal court. See id.
86 481 U.S. at 57.
82 Id.
88 Id. at 50.
a Id. at 43.
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Life Insurance provided employee benefits under the Entex plan.
Dedeaux, following an injury at work, received disability benefits
from Pilot Life for two years. For the next three years, Pilot Life
reinstated and terminated Dedeaux's benefits on numerous occa-
sions. 9°
Dedeaux filed suit in federal court, alleging various state com-
mon law claims, including breach of contract, fraud, and breach of
fiduciary duty.'" He claimed $250,000 in compensatory damages
and $500,000 in punitive damages. 92
 Pilot Life then moved for
summary judgment."
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Mississippi granted summary judgment to Pilot Life on the basis
that ERISA preempted the alleged state common law claims." On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed the district court's decision." The appeals court held that
ERISA did not preempt Dedeaux's claims because the action in-
volved a law regulating insurance and thus was saved under section
5 14(b)(4). 96
 The United States Supreme Court, recognizing a split
in the circuits on the issue of whether or not ERISA preempted
state common law claims, granted certiorari. 97
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit in Pilot and held
that ERISA preempted Mississippi's law of "bad faith." 98 In reaching
this conclusion, the Court ruled that Mississippi's law clearly "related
to" an employee benefit plan." Next, the Court analyzed whether
the claim was saved by section 514(b) of ERISA.w° The Court
interpreted the phrase "regulated insurance" to mean that the law
at issue must be specifically directed toward the insurance industry
and must not just affect the industry.'" Applying this standard, the
5.° Id.
91 Id.
Id. at 43-44.
Id. at 44.
94 Id.
95 Id.
770 F.2d 1311, 1316, 1317 (5th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
97 See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, cert. granted, 478 U.S. 1004 (1986); Nelson, Pilot
Life Co. v. Dedeaux: The Supreme Court's Federalization of Employee Benefit Law, 23 Tow,. &
L.J. 507, 510-11 (1988).
ON 481 U.S. at 57.
u" Id. at 47.
,"" Id. at 48.
L"I Id. at 50.
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Court held that Mississippi's law of bad faith was not specifically
directed at the insurance industry and therefore did not qualify for
an exemption from ERISA's preemption under the savings
clause. 102 Thus, ERISA preempted Dedeaux's claim because his
claim related to an employee benefit plan and was not specifically
directed at the insurance industry.m
To support its holding in Pilot, the Court relied on legislative
history and the structure of ERISA's civil enforcement provisions.'"
The legislative history, the Court noted, illustrated that Congress
clearly intended that the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA,
section 502(a), operate as the exclusive vehicle for action by ERISA-
plan participants and beneficiaries.m 5 As a result, the Court rea-
soned, varying state causes of action for claims covered within sec-
tion 502(a) would frustrate the purposes and objectives of Congress
and should be preempted. 106 After examining the legislative history
of section 502(a), the Court concluded that Congress intended this
section, like section 301 of the LMRA, to provide an exclusive
remedy.'"
1°2 Id. at 57. The Court then went on to analyze the claim in terms of the McCarren-
Ferguson Act, illustrating that the claim was not a law that affected the "business of insur-
ance." Id. at 48-51. The "business of insurance," according to the Court, involves three
factors: first, whether the practice transfers or spreads policyholders' risk; second, whether
the practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and insured;
and third, whether the practice is limited to entities in the insurance industry. Id. at 48-49
(quoting Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982)). The Court held
that the Mississippi law of bad faith may have only met the second factor. Id. at 51 I.
I" , Id, at 57.
1 '4 Id. at 51-53. Section 502(a), ERISA's civil enforcement provision, provides in pertinent
part as follows:
A civil action may be brought —
(1) by a participant or beneficiary —
(A) for the relief provided in subsection (c) of this section [concerning
requests to the administrator for information], or
(B) to recover benefits due to him [or her] under the terms of the plan, to
enforce rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his [or her] rights to
future benefits under the terms of the plan;
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate
relief under section 1109 of this title [breach of fiduciary duty];
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice
which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B)
to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii)
to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.
29 U.S.C. § I I 32(a) (1982), ERISA § 502(a) (1974).
t°5 Pilot, 481 U.S. at 54.
111" See id. at 56.
I" Id.
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The Supreme Court also recognized in Pilot that section 502(a)
provided a comprehensive civil enforcement scheme.'° 8
 The Court
described section 502(a) as a careful balance between the need for
prompt and fair settlement procedures and the public interest in
encouraging formation of employee benefit plans.'° 9 The inclusion
of certain remedies and the exclusion of others, the Court ex-
plained, illustrated this policy."° The Court added that to allow
ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries to obtain state law rem-
edies that Congress specifically rejected in ERISA would undermine
section 502(a). 11' Therefore, after an examination of the legislative
history and statutory language of section 502(a), the Pilot Court
reasoned that Congress intended ERISA to preempt state claims
providing additional remedies to plan participants. As a result, the
Court held that ERISA preempted Mississippi's law of "bad faith."
Thus, the United States Supreme Court, in a number of hold-
ings over the past decade, has extended the preemptive scope of
ERISA to include state common law and statutory claims that "relate
to" an employee benefit plan and that supply additional remedies
not provided for under section 502(a)." 2 The Supreme Court in
Shaw gave plain meaning to the "relates to" clause and held that
section 514(a) preempts a state law if the state law has a "connection
with or reference to" an employee benefit plan."' The Pilot Court
expanded this analysis and added that, if varying state law could
supplant remedies available to ERISA participants and beneficiaries
under 502(a), this would frustrate Congress' intent that a uniform
body of federal common law develop under ERISA." 4
 Thus, the
1 °8 Id. at 54.
1119 Id.
"° Id.
111 Id. For additional support, see Massachusetts Mm. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S.
134, l46 (1985) ("The six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found in § 502(a)
. provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it
simply forgot to incorporate expressly.").
11 ' See Pilot, 481 U.S. at 57; Russell, 473 U.S. at 145-46 ("Other equitable relief" does
not include punitive damages. Section 502(a), with six integrated civil enforcement provisions,
suggests the Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies.). See generally Note, Punitive
Damages and ERISA: An Anomalous Effect of ERISA's Preemption of Common Law Actions. 65
WASH. U.L.Q. 589, 599-609 (1987).
1 " 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983).
114 481 U.S. at 56. Also, in Menhorn a. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., the court presented
three related ends that the adoption of federal common law under ERISA serves. 738 F.2d
1496, 1499 (9th Cir. 1984). First, it supplements the statutory scheme interstitially. Second,
the common law serves to ramify and develop the standards that the statute sets out in only
general terms. Finally, Congress viewed ERISA as a grant of authority to the courts to
develop principles governing areas of the law regulating employee benefits that had previ-
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Pilot Court stated that ERISA preempts state claims that "relate to"
an employee benefit plan and provide additional remedies to plan
participants.''"'
III. COMMON LAW CLAIMS OF ESTOPPEL AND ERISA's PREEMPTION
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Pilot, the courts were
unclear whether or not ERISA preempted state common law
claims. 16 Plan participants and beneficiaries frequently raised the
state common law claim of estoppel to prevent the plan administra-
tor or trustee from denying them benefits due under the plan.'''
Because neither the statutory language nor the legislative history of
ERISA addresses the issue of ERISA's preemption of estoppel
claims, the judiciary has resolved the problem by relying upon the
combined guidance of ER ISA's policies, legislative history, and sta-
tutory language, and by analogizing to the LMRA." 8 As a result of
a case-by-case formulation of federal common law, two major trends
emerged within the federal circuit courts in addressing the problem
of state common law claims of estoppel under ERISA."" Although
courts have uniformly held that ERISA preempts state common law
claims, some courts recognize federal common law estoppel under
ERISA while other courts refuse to recognize a federal claim of
estoppel.
A. Pre-Pilot Decisions
Prior to Pilot, the majority of federal circuit courts — seven —
concluded that ERISA preempts state common law estoppel claims
as a matter of law.'" After reaching this conclusion, these circuits
either did not consider or refused to recognize estoppel as a federal
ously been under state law. Id.; see also Amato v. Western Union Intl Inc., 773 F.2d 1402,
1419 (2d Cir. 1985) ("In appropriate circumstances, courts may develop a federal common
law under ERISA."); Van Orman v. American Ins. Co., 680 F.2d 301, 313-14 (3d Cir. 1982)
(the court refused to recognize an unjust enrichment claim under ERISA because no statutory
policy supported its adoption into federal common law). See generally M. REDISII, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION: TE:NSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER, 79-107 (1980).
115
 481 U.S. at 56,
10 See supra note 97.
117 See, e.g., Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 1 7.2d 956, 959 (11th Cir. 1986); Amato, 773 F.2d
at 1406.
110 See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of the creation of a
federal common law under ER1SA.
119 See, e.g., Nachwalter, 805 F.2d at 960; Amato, 773 F.2d at 1420.
1 " See infra notes 123-142 and accompanying text for cases not recognizing estoppel as
a federal common law claim under ERISA.
1408	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 30:1391
common law claim under ERISA. 121 In contrast to those circuits
refusing to recognize federal estoppel, four circuits have formulated
a federal common law claim of estoppel into the common law under
ER1SA.' 22
Prior to Pilot, four of the majority of seven circuits held without
further analysis that ERISA preempted state common law claims of
estoppe1. 123 Decisions of three other circuits held that ERISA
preempts state common law estoppel claims and then proceeded to
analyze the action of the plan administrator under the arbitrary
and capricious standard of review.' 24
In the 1986 case of Nachwalter v. Christie, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, without addressing ER-
ISA's preemption, examined whether the federal common law un-
der ERISA should recognize estoppel claims.' 25 In Nachwalter, the
plaintiffs, who were the plan trustees, brought a declaratory judg-
ment action to determine the proper valuation date of a pension
' 2 ' Id.
142 See infra notes 145-163 and accompanying text for cases recognizing a federal
common law claim of estoppel under ERISA. See, e.g., Chambless v. Masters, Mates & Pilots
Pension Plan, 722 F.2d 1032, 1041 (2d Cir. 1985) (although the court recognized the existence
of estoppel claims under ERISA, it reaffirmed its reluctance to apply the estoppel doctrine),
cert. denied, 975 U.S. 1012 (1986); Kann v. Keystone Resources, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1084, 1093
(W.D. Pa. 1983). Although many courts do not identify a source within ERISA for the
estoppel claim, some courts have traced an estoppel claim to section 502(a)(3)(B) — "other
equitable relief." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B) (1982), ERISA § 502(a)(3)(B). See, e.g., Vogel v.
Independence Fed. Say. Bank, 692 F. Supp. 587, 594 (D. Md. 1988) (estoppel is an equitable
doctrine under section 502(a)(3)(B)).
125 See Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956, 959 (11th Cir. 1986).
See Ellenberg v. Brockway, Inc., 763 F.2d 1091, 1095, 1096 (9th Cir. 1985); Menhorn
v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d 1496, 1508 (9th Cir. 1984). See also 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a)(1) (1982), ERISA § 404(a)(1). Courts have uniformly applied the arbitrary and
capricious standard to judge employers' actions in the operation and management of em-
ployee benefit plans under ERISA. See, e.g., Moore v. Provident Life & Accident lns. Co.,
786 F.2d 922, 928 (9th Cir. 1986) (state common law estoppel claim preempted under section
514(a) of ERISA); Holland v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d 1141, 1148, 1149 (4th Cir.
1985) (because ERISA preempted state severance pay statute, the court applied the arbitrary
and capricious standard to judge the employer's actions), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 901 (1986);
Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348, 1353, 1354, 1356 (9th Cir. 1985) (court applied
arbitrary and capricious standard and held plaintiff's estoppel claim "related to" an ERISA
welfare plan and was therefore preempted by ERISA); Phillips v. Kennedy, 542 F.2d 52, 54,
55 n.8 (8th Cir, 1976) (court refused to recognize a federal common law estoppel claim under
ERISA, and alternatively held the actions of the trustees to be arbitrary and capricious). See
generally Note, Severance Pay Claims After A Sale of Assets: ERISA Sweeps The Field, 60 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 300, 318-24 (1986); Comment, The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard under ERISA: Its
Origins and Application, 23 Duq. L. REV. 1033, 1041-56 (1985).
125 805 F.2d 956, 959 (11th Cir. 1986), Appellant conceded that ER1SA preempted
estoppel claims. Id.
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and profit-sharing plan. 125 The trustees argued that the written
terms of the plan governed the valuation of the plan.' 27 The plan
participant, however, alleged that an oral agreement made by the
trustees promising an earlier valuation date should govern. 12 m
The Eleventh Circuit examined whether federal common law
under ERISA should recognize the participant's claim of estop-
peli 29 The court presented three principles arguing against the
application of estoppel as a matter of law.' 3° First, the court stated
that ERISA's statutory language requires employee benefit plans to
be established and maintained under an express written plan.'"'
The court concluded that the application of estoppel in this case
would directly contradict ERISA's requirement that plans be in
writing.
Second, the court. noted that Congress expressly prohibited
informal written amendments to ERISA plans.' 32 The court rea-
soned that the formal amendment procedure required by ERISA,
combined with ERISA's policy requiring each plan to specify in
writing its amendment procedure, indicated that Congress im-
pliedly disapproved of informal written or oral agreements that
modify ERISA plans.'" The court concluded that ERISA's statutory
language precluded oral modifications of ERISA plans.
Third, the court stated that in order to create a federal common
law claim of estoppel under ERISA that allowed oral modifications
to an employee benefit plan, the state law remedy must be consistent
with both ERISA's policies and statutory scheme.' 34 To illustrate
how the recognition of estoppel under ERISA would thwart the
employees' interests, the court explained that, by permitting oral
modifications, employees would be unable to rely on the security of
the pension funds if the employees' expected retirement benefits
could be disbursed to other employees under oral agreements.'"''
Thus, because ERISA's policies and statutory language failed to
support the application of estoppel allowing oral modification of
126 Id. at 958.
' 37 See id.
123 Id. The participants wanted the earlier valuation date because the plan assets plum-
meted due to unauthorized transactions on behalf of the funds. Id.
12, Id. at 959.
ou Id. at 960.
' 3 ' Id.
132 Id.
L33 Id.
134 Id.
133 Id.
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ER1SA plans, the Eleventh Circuit refused to recognize a common
law claim of estoppel under ERISA.'"
In contrast to Nachwalter's rejection of estoppel without further
analysis, in the 1985 case of Ellenberg v. Brockway, Inc., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit after refusing to
recognize the state estoppel claim, proceeded to analyze the em-
ployer's actions under ERISA's arbitrary and capricious standard
of review.' 37 In Ellenberg, the plaintiff sought to recover early pen-
sion benefits under Brockway's employee benefit plan on estoppel
grounds.'" The Ninth Circuit concluded that the state estoppel
claim, alleging improper handling of Ellenberg's benefit plan, was
"related to" the ERISA plan and thus preempted by ERISA.'"
Ellenberg, attempting to receive early retirement benefits, pro-
vided an incorrect birth date on his benefit plan application.' 4° After
Ellenberg received retirement benefits for two and a half months,
Brockway informed Ellenberg that there was some question con-
cerning his birth date and that Brockway would suspend payment
of benefits until he. resolved any discrepancies."' Following the
receipt of school records and insurance applications, Brockway de-
nied Ellenberg early retirement benefits because Ellenberg was not
yet eligible based on his true age. 142
13b Id, at 961.
"2 763 F.2d 1091, 1095, 1096 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Menhorn v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 738 F.2d 1496, 1508 (9th Cir. 1984) (arbitrary and capricious standard applied
to an estoppel claim).
13' 763 F.2d at 1093. The plaintiff also sought relief for breach of fiduciary duty, arbitrary
and capricious conduct of fiduciaries, and breach of an implied covenant. Id. See also O'Grady
v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 635 F. Supp. 81, 83-84 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (Although ERISA
preempted state estoppel claim, the same facts that support a state common claim of estoppel
may be analyzed under ERISA's arbitrary and capricious standard of' review); UAW v. Park-
Ohio Indus., Inc., 661 F. Supp. 1281, 1305 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (promissory estoppel claim
preempted by ERISA); Turner v. Retirement Plan of Marathon Oil Co., 659 F. Supp. 534,
541 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (plaintiff's estoppel claims alleging failure of the employer to calculate
properly benefits preempted by ERISA), aff 'd without opinion, 845 F.2d 327 (6th Cir. 1988);
United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am. v. Amcast Indus. Corp., 634 F. Supp. 1135,
1143 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (both the promissory estoppel and emotional distress claims arose
from defendant's administration of an ERISA plan; therefore, ERISA preempted these
claims). But see Cattin v. General Motors Corp., 612 F. Supp. 948, 950 (ED. Mich. 1985)
(state contract claims alleging employer's wrongful termination of early retirement benefits
and improper modification of its offer of special recognition stock were held not preempted
by ERISA).
L39
 Ellenberg, 763 F.2d at 1095.
L4D Id. at 1094.
" 1 Id.
L42 Id. at 1094-95.
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After the Ninth Circuit held that ERISA preempted the state
estoppel claim, the court analyzed Brockway's claim under ERISA's
arbitrary and capricious standard of review." 5 The Ninth Circuit
concluded that Ellenberg could not have relied upon Brockway's
representations that he was eligible for early retirement when he
knew his age made him ineligible for such benefits.'" Therefore,
the Ellenberg court, although preempting state common law estoppel
claims, recognized estoppel principles as applicable to a claim for
arbitrary and capricious administration of a plan.
In contrast to those circuits refusing to recognize a federal
common law claim of estoppel, four circuits have formulated a
federal common law claim of estoppel under ERISA. 195 In 1985,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Amato
v. Western Union International, Inc., without directly addressing ER-
ISA's preemption, adopted New York state's estoppel standard into
federal law to resolve the employee's ERISA claim."6 In Amato, the
plaintiffs argued that Western Union had violated the employee
rights under the terms of the employee pension plan, by amending
the plan to reduce early retirement benefits.' 47 The plaintiffs alleged
a number of claims under ERISA, including a claim of estoppel. 148
Finding the allegations in support of an equitable estoppel claim
under federal common law sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss,
the court reversed- the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs'
estoppel claim.'"
The Second Circuit began its analysis of the plaintiffs' common
law claims in Amato by recognizing that, in certain circumstances,
courts may develop a federal common law under ERISA.' 5" After
14' Id. at 1096-97. The court listed four elements of estoppel. First, the party to be
estopped must know the facts. Second, the party to be estopped must intend that his or her
conduct shall be acted on or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to
believe it is so intended, Third, the latter must be ignorant of the true facts. Last, he or she
must. rely on the farmer's conduct to his injury. Id.
144 Id. at 1096.
14D See supra noie 122.
1 " 773 F.2d 1402, 1419 (2d Cir. 1985). Whereas the plaintiffs argued in favor of equitable
estoppel, the defendant argued for the application of promissory estoppel. Id. at 1420. One
element of a promissory estoppel claim under New York State law is that "an oral promise
must be made contemporaneously with or subsequent to the making of a written agreement."
Id. See also Kann v. Keystone Resources, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1084, 1093 (W.D. Pa. 1983)
(federal common law estoppel applied to require payment of benefits due under an ERISA
plan).
147 Id. at 1404.
14,1 Id. at 1406.
L49 Id. at 1420.
' 5° Id. at 1419.
1412
	
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol 30:1391
the court recognized but avoided resolution of ERISA's preemption
of state estoppel claims, the court then proceeded to analyze the
contract and estoppel claims under federal common law, looking to
New York state law for guidance.' 51 After considering the facts
under a claim of estoppel, the court held that plaintiffs' allegations
were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.' 52 Thus, the Amato
court recognized the federal common law claim of estoppel under
ERISA without directly passing on the ERISA preemption issue.
Similarly, in a case involving oral modification of an ERISA
plan, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
the 1980 case of Haeberle v. Board of Trustees of Buffalo Carpenters,
without directly addressing ERISA's preemption, recognized a fed-
eral claim of estoppel under ERISA.'" In Haeberle, the plaintiff
alleged that the plan trustees refused to award him pension benefits
to which he was entitled under terms of the pension plan.' 54 Hae-
berle also alleged that he relied on oral representations of the plan
administrator concerning the vesting of Haeberle's benefits.'"
In denying the plaintiff recovery under the federal law of
estoppel, the Second Circuit in Haeberle stated that it would only
apply the estoppel doctrine against an ERISA pension fund when
each element of estoppel is clearly established.'" The court stated
that a plaintiff must meet three elements to establish a claim for
estoppel under federal law.' 57 First, the party being estopped must
have made a representation of material fact to the plaintiff.'" Sec-
ond, the party asserting estoppel must have rightfully relied on the
representations.' 59 Third, the party seeking estoppel must suffer
injury or damages resulting from a denial of benefits.' 6°
Additionally, the court noted that it must consider the strong
public policy in support of maintaining the actuarial soundness of
"' Id.
'" Id. at 1420.
" 624 F.2d 1132, 1139 (2d Cir. 1980).
15' Id. al 1134.
"5 Id.
1" Id. at 1139.
1 " See id.; accord Cleary v. Graphic Communications 1nel Union, 841 F.2d 444, 447 (1st
Cir. 1988) (in an estoppel case under ERISA the court adopted the Haeberle federal common
law estoppel standard). But see Apponi v. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 809 F.2d 1210, 1217 (6th
Cir.) (court adopted a five part federal estoppel standard under LMRA), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 77 (1987),
Haeberle, 624 F.2d at 1139.
"9 Id.
150
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pension plans in its application of the estoppel doctrine.'" Absent
extraordinary circumstances, the court in Haeberle explained, ER-
ISA's policy of insuring the actuarial soundness of pension funds is
too important to permit trustees to obligate the fund to pay pensions
to persons not entitled to benefits under the express terms of the
ERISA plan.'" Thus, the Haeberle court, in denying the plaintiff's
estoppel claim, held that the plaintiff failed to establish both his
reliance on the representation of the fund's trustee and his injury
as a result of the alleged reliance. 16"
The pre-Pilot case law, therefore, illustrates that two distinct
trends developed within the circuits with respect to resolving estop-
pel claims under ERISA. Although the courts have not formally
recognized state common law estoppel claims, some circuits, without
addressing ERISA's preemption of state common law claims, have
recognized that a federal common law .doctrine of estoppel exists
under ERISA. The circuits that are willing to recognize federal
estoppel, however, are reluctant to apply the doctrine and thus
restrict its application to a very limited set of circumstances. Con-
versely, other circuits refuse to recognize a federal common law
claim of estoppel under ERISA, and instead apply ERISA's arbi-
trary and capricious standard of review.
B. Post-Pilot Decisions
After Pilot, the circuits continued to recognize federal common
law estoppel under ERISA without reevaluating the adoption or
rejection of state common law estoppel in relation to the Supreme
Court's holding in Pilot.'" Circuits recognizing state estoppel prior
to Pilot continued to do so after Pilot because the federal common
law under ERISA had already incorporated state estoppel. 16" Courts
preempting state estoppel claims prior to Pilot continued this trend
after Pilot." Thus, the courts have followed pre-Pilot precedent in
their respective circuits in adjudicating post-Pilot cases.
161 Id.
162 Id.
165 See id.
164 See infra notes 167-185 and accompanying text for post-Pilot decisions.
' 65 See, e.g., Cleary v. Graphic Communications lnt'l Union, 841 F.2d 444, 449 (1st Cir.
1988); Vogel v. Independence Fed. Say. Bank, 692 F. Supp. 587, 594 (D. Md. 1988) (in an
action against a trustee for altering the terms of an ERISA plan, the court recognized an
estoppel action under ERISA arising from section 502(a)(3)(H), which granted equitable
powers to the courts).
" See, e.g., Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 488, 492 (2d Cir. 1988) (in an
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In the 1988 case of Straub v. Western Union Telegraph Co., a post-
Pilot case involving the oral modification of an ERISA plan, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit refused to
adopt the estoppel doctrine into the federal common law under
ERISA.'"7 The plaintiff, Straub, had an oral agreement with the
defendant, Western Union, that after termination of employment
with Western Union, he would still be eligible to participate in
Western Union's pension plan.'"" The court held that the written
terms of the ERISA plan governed and foreclosed the application
of estoppel.' 69
In Straub, two years after the plaintiff left employment with
Western Union, Western Union orally agreed to increase the ben-
efits under the pension plan. ' 7° The plaintiff's current employer at
that time, however, a subsidiary of Western Union, refused to ratify
the increase in pension benefits."' Upon retirement, Western Union
denied the plaintiff the increased pension benefits under the mod-
ified benefit plan. In response, the plaintiff alleged a state estoppel
claim based on oral modification of an ERISA
After holding that ERISA preempts the state claims, the court
in Straub proceeded to analyze the estoppel claim under ERISA's
federal common law. 173 The Tenth Circuit in Straub, following the
Eleventh Circuit's pre-Pilot decision in Nachwalter, refused to apply
estoppel to allow oral modifications to a written plan. 174 Finding
additional support for its holding, the court added that ERISA's
statutory language, requiring that ERISA plans be in writing, fore-
closed the argument that Congress intended state common law
action concerning the alleged oral modification to an ERISA plan, the court refused to apply
estoppel under ERISA unless the estoppel claim was based upon a formal written document
which contradicts the rights contained in the original written plan); Hermann Hosp. v. MEBA
Medical & Benefits Plan, 845 F.2d 1286, 1290 (5th Cir. 1988) (state common law estoppel
claim "related to" the MEBA plan and therefore preempted); Daniel v. Eaton Corp., 839
F.2t1263, 266 (61.1) Cir. 1988) (state common law estoppel claim preempted by ERISA, because
the claim "arise[sl from the administration of (the Plan]"); Hartness v. Printing & Graphic
Arts Union No. 3, No. 86-C7932 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file)
(court held state common law estoppel claim "related to" an employee benefit plan and was
therefore preempted by ERISA).
167
 851 F.2d 1262, 1265-66 (10th Cir, 1988).
168 Id. at 1263.
169
 Id. at 1265-66.
L" See id. at 1263.
"I Id.
172 Id.
17 ' Id. at 1264-65.
174 Id. at 1265.
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claims of estoppel to apply to oral contracts or modifications. There-
fore, because the plaintiff's claim relied on an oral modification to
a written ERISA plan, the Tenth Circuit refused to apply federal
common law estoppel. 17 •
Similar to Straub, the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit, without addressing Pilot, held in the 1988 case of Cleary
v. Graphic Communications International Union that federal common
law did not estop the defendant from denying supplemental ben-
efits to the plaintiff. 17" In Cleary, the plaintiff, relying upon repre-
sentations made by the defendant union's official, continued to work
part-time for the union for three year's under the assumption that
part-time employment would maintain his eligibility for supplemen-
tal retirement benefits.'" The court noted that, although providing
supplemental benefits to part-time employees was a common prac-
tice of the union, it violated express terms of the ERISA plan. 178
The court in Cleary then considered the application of the
federal common law claim of estoppel under these facts and under
ERISA's basic policy of protecting the actuarial soundness of pen-
sion plans.' 7° The First Circuit, without addressing the implications
of the Pilot decision and ERISA's preemption of state common law
claims, examined the various representations made by the union
and the plaintiff's reliance on these alleged representations.m The
court recognized that. the union's representations of supplemental
benefit coverage and disbursement of benefits to Cleary comprised
a reasonable basis for reliance by the plaintiff. The court in Cleary
stated, however, that because the plaintiff also received and read
the plan rules, he was on notice that part-time employment for a
local union would not save his eligibility under the plan.' 8 ' Fur-
thermore, the court added that a union official made the represen-
tations, and plan rules foreclosed such statements from binding the
plati.' 82 The court in Cleary explained that the representations relied
upon must be made by someone with actual or apparent authority
to bind the plan in order to support an estoppel claim.'"
17 ' Id. at 1265-66.
176 84i F.2d 444,449 (1st Cir. 1988).
177 Id. at 445.
' 78 Id. at 449.
' 7" Id. at 447.
IHO Id.
nil Id.
"2 Id.
' 83 Id.
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Next, the First Circuit in Cleary considered the effect of the
plan trustee's "off the record" representations made to the plain-
tiff.' 84 In the interest of other plan participants and beneficiaries,
the court stated, the actuarial soundness of the plan must be pro-
tected and not deflated because of the misrepresentations or mis-
conduct of plan administrators or trustees. Thus, guided by the
policies of ERISA, the court concluded that, despite representations
by the union officials and plan trustees, and the reliance thereon
by the plaintiff, the plan trustees were not estopped from denying
supplemental benefits to the plaintiff.' 85
In summary, post-Pilot case law illustrates that courts generally
have not considered the effect of the United States Supreme Court
decision in Pilot and Pilot's preemption of state common law estop-
pel claims. The post-Pilot decisions either continue to hold that
federal estoppel claims under ERISA are still viable without ad-
dressing the implications of Pilot, or refuse to recognize any estoppel
claim and apply ERISA's arbitrary and capricious standard of re-
view. Thus, overall, the courts have failed to recognize the effect of
the Pilot decision on federal common law estoppel claims under
ERISA.
IV. ANALYSIS OF ERISA's PREEMPTION OF ESTOPPEL CLAIMS AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW UNDER ERISA
As a result of section 514(a), ERISA's sweeping preemption
provision, employee benefit plans are now largely under the exclu-
sive province of federal regulation.' 86 With only a few exceptions,
section 514(a) preempts all state laws that "relate to" employee
benefit plans.' 87 Recent United States Supreme Court decisions in
Shaw and Pilot have interpreted the scope of section 514(a)'s
preemption and held that ERISA preempts both state statutory and
state common law that has any "connection with or reference to"
an employee benefit plan. 188
One result of ERISA's broad preemption of state law is the
emergence of a federal common law under ERISA to fill the gaps
184 Id. at 448.
ths Id. at 449.
'" See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982), ERISA § 514(a) (1974).
0,7 See id. § 1144(b) (1982), ERISA § 514(b) (1974).
" See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 (1983).
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created by state law preemption.' 89 One of the greatest disadvan-
tages of an inflexible preemption provision is that it leaves no room
to fill the voids, or to examine the merits of each state law claim on
a case-by-case basis. Congress realized that ERISA's express statu-
tory provisions would be insufficient to establish a comprehensive
and cohesive regulatory scheme.'" To remedy this situation, Con-
gress empowered the courts to develop a uniform body of federal
common law governing employee benefit plans. 19 '
In formulating federal common law principles, courts must
have a coherent understanding of the reasons for ERISA's preemp-
tion of state law. In its analysis, a court must seek guidance from
the policies upon which ERISA was founded and the evils ERISA
was intended to cure. A court must also consider the statutory
language and comprehensive statutory scheme that ERISA repre-
sents. 192 Where federal principles are lacking or are inappropriate,
a court may resort to state law concepts and rules and principles
developed under other labor statutes.'" According to Congress,
however, only principles and concepts consistent with ERISA and
its underlying policies may be absorbed into federal common law
under ERISA.' 94
Prior to the 1987 United States Supreme Court decision in
Pilot, it was unclear whether ERISA preempted state common law
estoppel claims that were not specifically directed towards the gov-
ernance of benefit plans.'" Thus, prior to Pilot, federal courts were
faced with the task of adjudicating state common law estoppel
claims, and many courts faced the difficult question of whether to
create or recognize a federal estoppel claim under ERISA.
In the 1985 case of Amato, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit recognized estoppel under federal law with-
out directly addressing ERISA's preemption. 198 In Amato, the trust-
ees, by way of a formal written amendment to the employees' benefit
1 '9 See supra note 9 and accompanying text for a discussion of the creation of federal
common law under ERISA.
1st) ld.
01 Id.
' 92 See supra notes 129-136 and accompanying text for a discussion of the factors a court
examines in deciding whether the federal common law under ERISA should recognize
estoppel.
193 See supra notes 11-12, 150-151 and accompanying text for a discussion of other
factors a court considers in adopting state claims into federal common law under ERISA.
154 See id.
195 See Pilot Life Insurance v. Dedeaux, cert. granted, 478 U.S. 1004 (1986).
"6 See Ainato v. Western Union Intl, Inc,, 773 F.2d 1402, 1419-20 (2d Cir. 1985).
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plan, reduced the employees' benefits received under the terms of
the original plan.' 97 The policy of ERISA to ensure the actuarial
soundness of employee benefit plans was not in jeopardy in Amato
because the plan was not modified by an oral agreement.' 98 In its
analysis, the court failed to address the merits of ERISA's preemp-
tion and whether the adoption of estoppel under ERISA's federal
common law was consistent with ERISA's broad preemption
clause.' 99 Despite the court's failure to address ERISA's preemption,
based on the facts of Amato, the court reached a result consistent
with ERISA's policies and statutory scheme because the case in-
volved an alleged written, not oral, modification to an ERISA plan.
In contrast, seven circuits prior to Pilot refused to recognize
federal common law estoppel under ERISA and analyzed the facts
of the estoppel claims under ERISA's arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard of review. 2°° These courts reasoned that trustees should be
allowed more discretion in the administration of benefit plans. 20 '
Under the arbitrary and capricious standard, courts defer to the
trustee's judgment unless that judgment, based on the evidence,
was arbitrary, capricious, or made in bad faith. The application of
this standard, in many estoppel type situations, imposes an almost
insurmountable burden on the plaintiff. 202 Thus, the -arbitrary and
capricious standard protects the actions of the plan administrators
and trustees.
While strict application of the arbitrary and capricious standard
frequently denies employees' rights, the free application of estoppel
to any factual scenario would be inconsistent with the policies of
ERISA and ERISA's express statutory language. For example, in
Nachwalter, an employee relied on an oral statement made by the
plan trustee that modified the terms of his written benefit plan. 2"3
The Nachwalter court thoroughly analyzed the issues relating to
ERISA's preemption and considered the adoption of estoppel into
the federal common law under ERISA. 204 In Nachwalter, unlike
Amato, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit refused to
"v See id. at 1406.
195 See id. at 1420.
'" See id. at 1419-20.
'") See supra notes 137-144 and accompanying text for a case applying ERISA's arbitrary
and capricious standard of review.
2" ' See id.
2°2 See, e.g., Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956,959 (11th Cir. 1986); Haeberle v. Board
of Trustees of Buffalo Carpenters, 624 F.2d 1132,1139 (2d Cir. 1980).
2°' See Nachwalter, 805 F.2d at 959.
714 See id. at 959-60.
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recognize estoppel to permit an oral modification of an ERISA
plan."' The court reasoned that allowing oral modifications to a
benefit plan would be inconsistent with ERISA's express statutory
provisions that prohibit oral or informal written amenclunents. 20"
Also, the court added, to adopt estoppel would be contrary to
ERISA's goals of protecting the actuarial soundness of employee
benefit plans. 207 After deciding not to adopt estoppel, the Nachwalter
court implied that a different set of facts might persuade it to
recognize an estoppel claim, if the application of estoppel would be
consistent with ERISA's language and policies. 208
In Ellenberg, a pre-Pilot Ninth Circuit decision, the court
reached a result similar to Nachwalter's without discussing the for-
mulation of federal common law under ERISA. 209 The court in
Ellenberg, after holding that ERISA preempted the state common
law claim of estoppel, applied the arbitrary and capricious standard
of review. 210 The court reasoned that because the employee pro-
vided an incorrect birth date on his plan application, the employee's
reliance on the benefits already paid was unreasonable.'" The court
held, therefore, that the action of the trustee was not arbitrary and
capricious in denying the plaintiff benefits after the correct birth
date was discovered."'" Thus, the court failed to address the merits
of ERISA's preemption or, like Nachwalter, frame the analysis in
terms of potentially adopting a federal common law of estoppel
under ERISA. 21 s The court reached the correct result, however, in
its application of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review
because of the bad faith of the plaintiff.
The Eleventh Circuit's approach in Nachwalter, viewed in light
of the policies of ERISA, is the better approach."" To uniformly
hold a plan trustee to the minimal arbitrary and capricious standard
in all estoppel situations contravenes ERISA's policies of holding
trustees to higher fiduciary standards. 215 ERISA was intended to
protect plan participants and beneficiaries from unjust deprivation
205 See id.
2°6 Id. at 960.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 See Ellenberg v. Brockway, 763 F.2(1 1091, 1095 (9th Cir. 1985).
21" Id. at 1095, 1096.
211 Id,
212 Id. at 1097.
215 See id. at 1096-97.
214 See Nachwalter v, Christie, 805 F.2(.1 956, 959-60 (11th Cir. 1986).
215 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-13 (1982), ER1SA §§ 401-13 (1974).
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of anticipated benefits by setting strict standards to govern the
administration of employee benefit plans, and by providing for the
plan's financial soundness. 216 If a plan trustee knows that the arbi-
trary and capricious standard will protect his or her actions, as in
Ellenberg, ERISA neither adequately sets standards of conduct nor
provides appropriate remedies to plan participants who suffer as a
result of trustees' actions.217 Therefore, to achieve the goals of
ERISA, courts should adopt the Nachwalter analysis and consider
the adoption of estoppel under federal law when its application is
consistent with the policies and statutory language of ERISA.
After the 1987 United States Supreme Court decision in Pilot,
the Amato and Haeberle courts, which previously recognized estoppel
as a viable federal claim under ERISA, need to reconsider the
adoption and application of estoppel under ERISA. 218 Because of
Pilot's potential preemption of state common law estoppel claims,
courts need to reconsider the adoption and application of state
common law estoppel and insure that its application is consistent
with the policies of ERISA. 219 Reevaluation of pre-Pilot precedent
will help provide uniformity in estoppel claim adjudication within
the circuits and prevent circuits from relying on incorrect precedent
in light of Pilot.
The recent post-Pilot case law illustrates that the majority of
circuits have not reevaluated pre-Pilot adoptions of estoppe1. 22° In
both Straub and Cleary, the courts relied on pre-Pilot case law in
analyzing estoppel claims. 22 ' Additionally, neither court addressed
the implications of Pilot when considering whether to adopt estoppel
into federal common law under ERISA. 222
In Straub, the Tenth Circuit looked to the pre-Pilot Eleventh
Circuit decision in Nachwalter because both cases involved the oral
modification of a written benefit plan. 223 Similarly, the First Circuit
in Cleary, without even citing Pilot, followed the reasoning of the
216 See supra notes 3, 40, 43 and accompanying text for a discussion of ER1SA's legislative
history.
2" See Ellenberg, 763 F.2d 1091, 1095, 1096 (9th Cir. 1985); see also O'Grady v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 635 F. Stipp. 81, 83-84 (Si].. Ohio 1986).
218 See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 4I, 57 (1987).
219 Id. at 54-57.
27" See supra notes 164-185 and accompanying text for a discussion of post-Pilot case
law.
221 See Straub v. Western Union Tel. Co., 851 F.2d 1262, 1264-66 (10th Cir. 1988);
Cleary v. Graphic Communications Int'l Union, 841 F.2d 444, 997-49 (1st Cir. 1988).
222 See Straub, 851 F.2d at 1262-66; Cleary, 841 F.2d at 447-49.
222 See Straub, 851 F.2d at 1265.
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pre-Pilot case of Haeberle, in its analysis of an estoppel claim. 224
Therefore, the case law illustrates the courts' failure to reevaluate
their analysis in light of Pilot.
As a solution, this note proposes that courts adopt a balancing
test to determine whether to apply a federal common law analysis
of estoppel or an arbitrary and capricious standard of review. If
estoppel is deemed to apply, the plaintiff should be required to
clearly establish each of the three elements. 225 First, the plaintiff
must make an affirmative showing of lack of knowledge of the
truth.226 The plaintiff must also rely upon the representations of
the other party. 227 Last, the action taken by the plaintiff as a result
of the representation must cause injury to the plaintiff. 228 In addi-
tion, circuits should uniformly recognize the most predominant
federal estoppel standard, not the common law of the state in which
the particular court resides. In order to determine the correct stan-
dard to apply, courts should examine the underlying nature of the
ERISA claim. This proposed analysis should reflect an analysis sim-
ilar to that in Nachwalter where the court reasoned why the appli-
cation of federal common law estoppel is consistent with the policies
and statutory language of ERISA. 22° Courts should then balance
the competing federal and state interests in determining which
standard to apply. Courts should also weigh the policies of ERISA,
the participant's rights, and the participant's need for protection in
light of the facts of the particular claim.
In the court's analysis, it should focus on the particular conduct
of the parties involved. For example, if the trustees are attempting
to deny the participant benefits under a written plan, as in Amato,
federal common law estoppel should apply because the actuarial
soundness of the plan is not in jeopardy and statutory language of
ERISA support the application of estoppel. In the situation where
a participant relies on an oral modification or statement, however,
as did the plaintiff in Nachwalter and Haeberle, ERISA's policies of
protecting the actuarial soundness of plans demand the application
of the arbitrary and capricious standard. 23° In this latter situation,
224 See Cleat y, 841 F.2d at 447.
225 See Kann v. Keystone Resources, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1084, 1093 (W.D. Pa. 1983). For
a discussion of estoppel, see supra notes 153-163 and accompanying text.
226 See Kann, 575 F. Supp. at 1093.
227 See id.
228 See id.
229 See Nachwalter, 805 F.2d 956, 959-61 (11th Cir. 1986).
25° See id.; Haeberle v. Board of Trustees of Buffalo Carpenters, 624 F.2d 1132, 1139
(2d Cir. 1980).
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the application of the arbitrary and capricious standard would offer
added protection to the trustees' actions and help shield the trustees
from needless litigation. Thus, the potential for the application of
estoppel would have a positive effect on the actions of plan trustees
and encourage more equitable and efficient administration of em-
ployee benefit plans. Another benefit of this proposed balancing
test is that it would provide a guide to lower courts in adjudicating
estoppel claims under ERISA. Once uniform standards for evalu-
ating estoppel claims are established, these standards will guide the
actions of lower courts, ERISA trustees, and ERISA plan partici-
pants.
V. CONCLUSION
Circuits should adopt a uniform estoppel standard. In doing
so, they should utilize the most predominant federal common law
standard and not the common law of the state in which each court
resides. If all the circuits uniformly recognize a federal common
law claim of estoppel under ERISA and adopt a uniform estoppel
standard, this will better achieve ERISA's goals of providing uni-
form regulation for employee benefit plans. Additionally, holding
the trustee or employer to a higher standard in certain limited
situations encourages greater responsibility and increased aware-
ness in the management and administration of employee benefit
plans. This dual standard may also reduce the number of frivolous
claims brought by participants who ordinarily rely on the estoppel
doctrine. If the plaintiff fails to meet evidentiary or other require-
ments, the alleged estoppel claim will be adjudicated under the
arbitrary and capricious standard of review. Thus, incorporating
estoppel into the federal common law of ERISA, and applying it in
a limited number of situations, enhances the adjudication of ERISA
claims and better accomplishes the purposes of ERISA.
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